Arne Slot has resorted to all-out attack in two of Liverpool’s recent defeats and it has barely suited them – in fact, it goes against what makes them so strong.
During his first press conference as Liverpool head coach, Slot took exception to a question on his system.
“I was hoping if people looked at my team they would not say it is 4-2-3-1 or it is 4-3-3 or whatever formation you want to call it. I was hoping they would say there is a lot of freedom when they have the ball to take it in different positions,” he explained.
Slot did, though, add: “If you would have asked me, I would have said we played 4-3-3 instead of 4-2-3-1 at Feyenoord…I’m curious who told you we played 4-2-3-1, maybe that one should go get his [coaching] license.”
But for all intents and purposes, Slot’s Liverpool have shifted between a 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1 throughout his first campaign on Merseyside.
Roles can be tweaked, most notably his centre-forward and full-backs, but the biggest difference game-to-game is how Slot deploys his midfielders: sometimes there are two No. 6s and a No. 10, others a No. 6 and two No. 8s, and so on.
Swapping control for chaos
Control has been the defining word for the start of this new era for Liverpool – and at times, that has seen Slot’s style being viewed as less exciting than his predecessor’s.
But that control has led the Reds to the brink of a Premier League title with by far the league’s best goal difference, at least five more wins than any other team and 20 more than relegated Southampton.
Recently, however, Slot has resorted to a new tactic, for want of a better word.
In the second halves of both the Carabao Cup final against Newcastle and Sunday’s Premier League clash with Fulham, the Dutchman went all-out attack.
Both games saw Slot use all five of his allotted substitutes and both times they were all attacking changes:
Subs vs. Newcastle: Nunez for Jota; Jones for Konate; Gakpo for Mac Allister; Chiesa for Gravenberch; Elliott for Diaz
Subs vs. Fulham: Diaz for Gakpo; Elliott for Szoboszlai; Nunez for Jota; Bradley for Konate; Chiesa for Robertson
In both Slot saw fit to bring off a centre-back in Ibrahima Konate, against Newcastle he brought off two midfielders in Alexis Mac Allister and Ryan Gravenberch, and against Fulham he also substituted a full-back in Andy Robertson.
The final lineups for those two games after five changes were as follows:
Vs. Newcastle: Kelleher; Quansah, Van Dijk, Robertson; Jones, Elliott, Szoboszlai; Salah, Chiesa, Nunez, Gakpo
Vs. Fulham: Kelleher; Bradley, Van Dijk, Gravenberch; Mac Allister, Elliott, Jones; Salah, Chiesa, Nunez, Diaz
Both times it was nominally a 3-3-4 setup but in execution it was much more chaotic and came with varying degrees of success.
Where the idea began
The first seeds of this approach actually came in the reverse fixture against Fulham at Anfield in December, when an early red card for Robertson forced Slot to take action.
Instead of sacrificing a forward to bring on an orthodox defender, the head coach turned to Gravenberch as a stand-in centre-back in a system which began as a 3-4-2 and later settled as more of a 4-2-3.
Slot placed more demand on his two remaining midfielders and in that instance was rewarded as Dominik Szoboszlai produced a tireless display in a 2-2 draw which, after Diogo Jota‘s equaliser in the 86th minute, felt like a victory.
But while that was viewed as a masterclass of sorts from Slot, these two more recent iterations of the all-out-attack setup have resembled more contrived chaos.
On both occasions it has felt similar to the desperate gamble of sending a goalkeeper up for a late corner in search of a goal.
But unlike the quick roll of the dice that led to Alisson‘s winner at West Brom almost four years ago, this is an altogether shift of structure and it allows opponents to adjust and exploit gaps in an unfamiliar setup.
Fulham, who should clearly not be underestimated, managed to do that and it was not entirely due to tweaks from Marco Silva.
More bodies, less control
In moving him into a three-man defence with Gravenberch and Van Dijk, Slot stifled the natural attacking quality Conor Bradley had offered when first introduced midway through the second half.
Instead Bradley, who set Luis Diaz up to make it 3-2 just five minutes after the pair were sent on, was forced to play centre-back, right-back and central midfield all at once.
And bringing off Robertson for Federico Chiesa may have added another body in the final third, but it denied Liverpool an outlet on the left at a time when the Scot was finally offering a genuine threat going forwards.
Against Newcastle, with Liverpool chasing an unlikely result in a one-off final, even Virgil van Dijk ended up playing the final throes up front with Curtis Jones dropping back to cover at centre-back.
Put simply, there may be more attackers on the pitch, but it often means they just get in each other’s way.
While this criticism comes under the lens of a bitter defeat, and had Liverpool pulled it back for a draw or even a victory things would be viewed differently, it is difficult to shake the feeling of desperation around this all-out-attack mode.
After a third disappointing result in the last four games the biggest takeaway remains that those additional attackers – and chiefly Chiesa and Harvey Elliott – should really be trusted more starting in Slot’s 4-3-3.
